{"id":8399,"date":"2026-10-21T20:20:24","date_gmt":"2026-10-21T20:20:24","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/mylegalacademy.net\/?p=8399"},"modified":"2026-10-21T20:20:37","modified_gmt":"2026-10-21T20:20:37","slug":"the-constitutional-role-of-parliaments-appointments-committee-a-historical-overview-and-a-revisit-of-the-classic-case-of-mensah-v-attorney-general-1997-1998","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mylegalacademy.net\/index.php\/2026\/10\/21\/the-constitutional-role-of-parliaments-appointments-committee-a-historical-overview-and-a-revisit-of-the-classic-case-of-mensah-v-attorney-general-1997-1998\/","title":{"rendered":"The Constitutional Role of Parliament\u2019s Appointments Committee: A Historical Overview and a Revisit of the Classic Case of Mensah v Attorney-General (1997\u20131998)"},"content":{"rendered":"\t\t
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The Constitutional Role of Parliament\u2019s Appointments Committee: A Historical Overview and a Revisit of the Classic Case of Mensah v Attorney-General (1997\u20131998).<\/h4>\n

Ghana adopted the 1992 Constitution, and the First Parliament of the Fourth Republic commenced on 7 January 1993. From the beginning of the Fourth Republic, parliamentary scrutiny of presidential appointments became an important feature of Ghana\u2019s constitutional order. The Constitution requires parliamentary approval for certain appointments to ensure that the President does not exercise the power of appointment without the required checks and balances by Parliament.<\/p>\n

One of the early legal questions that arose from this constitutional arrangement concerned whether Ministers and Deputy Ministers retained in office by a new President or a new Parliament needed to obtain fresh parliamentary approval. This question eventually came before the Supreme Court in Mensah v Attorney-General.<\/p>\n

Before we examine the case, it is important to understand the place of the Appointments Committee within Parliament. The Committee is a standing committee, meaning that it forms part of Parliament\u2019s permanent committee structure and continues to perform its assigned functions throughout the life of a Parliament. Its composition may change from one Parliament to another. This distinguishes standing committees from ad hoc or select committees, which are constituted for specific purposes or particular inquiries and may cease to exist once their assignments are completed.<\/p>\n

Other examples of standing committees of Parliament include:<\/p>\n

Privileges Committee:<\/strong> The Committee of Privileges and Immunities is responsible for investigating complaints of contempt of Parliament and breaches of parliamentary privilege formally referred to it by the House. The Committee is chaired by the First Deputy Speaker, Hon. Bernard Ahiafor, Esq., in this 8th Parliament.<\/p>\n

Assurance Committee:<\/strong> This Committee monitors the implementation of assurances, promises, and undertakings made to Parliament by Ministers, Committee Chairpersons, Members of Parliament, and other State officials. It is usually chaired by a member of the opposition. It is currently chaired by Dominic Bingab Aduna Nitiwul, MP for Bimbilla.<\/p>\n

Other examples include the Budget Committee, Backbenchers\u2019 Committee, the Chieftaincy, Culture and Religious Affairs Committee, etc. Having considered these examples, let us return to the Appointments Committee.<\/p>\n

The principal function of the Appointments Committee is to assist Parliament in scrutinizing presidential nominees for positions requiring parliamentary approval. These include Ministers of State, Deputy Ministers, the Chief Justice, Supreme Court Justices, and the Special Prosecutor, subject to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions. The Committee examines nominees and submits its recommendations to the House. However, the Committee does not itself exercise Parliament\u2019s constitutional power of approval. Its role is to vet and recommend; the ultimate decision rests with Parliament.<\/p>\n

The constitutional foundation of this process is particularly important. Article 78(1) of the 1992 Constitution requires the President to obtain Parliament\u2019s prior approval for the appointment of Ministers of State. Article 79 similarly provides for parliamentary approval of Deputy Ministers, while Article 144 requires Supreme Court nominees to be approved by Parliament. However, the Appointments Committee itself is not expressly established by the Constitution. Rather, it is a parliamentary mechanism through which Parliament facilitates the performance of its constitutional responsibility to scrutinize nominees before deciding whether to approve their appointments.<\/p>\n

This distinction between vetting and approval is central to understanding the Committee\u2019s role. The Appointments Committee may examine a nominee and recommend approval or rejection, but it cannot substitute its decision for that of Parliament. Where the Constitution requires parliamentary approval, the nominee must obtain that approval before lawfully assuming the relevant office. The question that arose in 1997 was whether this requirement applied only to newly appointed Ministers and Deputy Ministers or also to those retained in office.<\/p>\n

That question led to the landmark case of Mensah v Attorney-General (1997\u20131998). The events preceding the case are particularly instructive because they demonstrate how a parliamentary decision concerning its internal procedures can raise fundamental constitutional questions. Let\u2019s go through it together.<\/p>\n

On 13 February 1997, the Appointments Committee of Parliament met and decided that where an incumbent Minister or Deputy Minister was retained in office by the President, it would not be necessary to summon that person before the Committee for a fresh recommendation to Parliament. The reasoning was that the individual had previously been appointed with parliamentary approval, and therefore a further approval would not be necessary.<\/p>\n

The following day, 14 February 1997, the Chairperson of the Appointments Committee, Hon. Kenneth Dzirasah, who was also the First Deputy Speaker of Parliament, introduced a motion inviting Parliament to adopt the Committee\u2019s decision. Parliament subsequently resolved to adopt it. The decision was then communicated to the President by the Speaker of Parliament, Justice Daniel Francis Annan.<\/p>\n

In a letter dated 18 February 1997, the Speaker conveyed Parliament\u2019s resolution to the President in the following terms:<\/p>\n

\u201cIf a person has been appointed a Minister or Deputy Minister with the approval of Parliament and as an incumbent Minister or Deputy Minister, he is retained by the President, it shall not be necessary for Parliament to give another approval of such Minister or Deputy Minister.\u201d<\/p>\n

The effect of this decision was that Mr. Richard Kwame Peprah, the Minister of Finance nominee, and six other nominees who had previously received parliamentary approval were not required to obtain fresh approval. This raised a serious constitutional question: could Parliament, by a resolution concerning its internal procedures, dispense with a requirement that the Constitution itself had imposed?<\/p>\n

The Minority Leader at the time, Joseph Henry Mensah (J. H. Mensah), challenged the decision. He filed a motion for an interim injunction to prevent Mr. Kwame Peprah from presenting the Budget on 19 February 1997. He also instituted an action in the Supreme Court seeking, among other things, the following declaration:<\/p>\n

\u201cA declaration that on a true and proper interpretation of the Constitution, particularly articles 57(3), 58(1) and (3), 66(1), 76(1) and (2) 78(1) 79(1), 80, 81, 97(1)(a), 100(1), 113(1) and (3) thereof, no person can after 6 January 1997 act as minister or deputy minister of state without the prior approval by the Second Parliament of the Fourth Republic of his appointment\u201d.<\/p>\n

The Supreme Court was therefore called upon to determine, among other things, the following issues:<\/p>\n

Whether the term of office of Ministers and Deputy Ministers of State appointed by the first President of the Fourth Republic ended on 6 January 1997.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Whether the prior approval of the Second Parliament of the Fourth Republic was required before a Minister or Deputy Minister appointed by the President could lawfully act or hold himself or herself out as a Minister or Deputy Minister of State.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Argument of the Plaintiff<\/p>\n

The Plaintiff was represented by H. E. Nana Akufo-Addo, Esq., together with Akoto Ampaw, Esq. Their argument centred on the meaning of the word \u201capproval\u201d and the constitutional obligation imposed on Parliament. They relied on the Third New International Dictionary (Language Unabridged) (3rd ed, 1968), which defined approval as \u201cthe act of approving\u201d, and defined the verb \u201capprove\u201d at page 106, among other things, as \u201ca) make or show to be worthy of approbation or acceptance; b) to judge and find commendable or acceptable.\u201d<\/p>\n

They further argued that:<\/p>\n

\u201c\u2026Constitution, 1992 enjoins Parliament to give its prior approval (ie consider, examine and vet) to each person nominated by the President for ministerial office, and that it is each Parliament’s duty to perform this function, involving the independent judgment of Parliament which the Constitution, 1992 forbids one Parliament to shirk by substitution for it another Parliament’s judgment. In other words, this requirement cannot be carried by any procedure or resolution by Parliament that \u2018hold-over ministers\u2019 do not need to be vetted because a constitutional requirement cannot be overruled by Parliament under cover of Parliament being master of. its own internal procedures\u201d.<\/p>\n

In essence, the Plaintiff contended that each Parliament was constitutionally required to exercise its own independent judgment on ministerial nominees. A previous Parliament\u2019s approval could not automatically replace the approval required from a subsequent Parliament.<\/p>\n

Argument of the Defendant<\/p>\n

The Defendant was represented by Hon. Dr. Obed Asamoah, the Attorney-General, together with Hon. Martin Amidu, Deputy Attorney-General, and Avah, Chief State Attorney. The Defendant argued that the requirement of prior parliamentary approval did not apply to \u201chold-over ministers\u201d, meaning Ministers and Deputy Ministers retained in office. The Attorney-General maintained that the phrase \u201cwith prior approval of Parliament\u201d did not necessarily require such Ministers to undergo fresh consideration and vetting.<\/p>\n

The Defendant further argued that the requirement was not intended to:<\/p>\n

\u201c\u2026institute a regime of witch hunting and malicious sander under the cover of absolute parliamentary privilege.\u201d<\/p>\n

The Attorney-General relied, among other provisions, on articles 89(6), 124(5) and 174(2) of the 1992 Constitution to support the argument that the phrase \u201cprior approval\u201d did not invariably mean the same procedure in every constitutional context. He also contended that even if the Court accepted the ordinary dictionary meaning of \u201capproval\u201d advanced by the Plaintiff, the procedure through which Parliament granted approval was a matter for Parliament and not the Court to determine.<\/p>\n

After considering the submissions of both parties, the Supreme Court examined the meaning of \u201cprior approval of Parliament\u201d within the context of the Constitution.<\/p>\n

The Court held:<\/p>\n

\u201cAfter examining closely submissions of both counsel, it seems to me incontestable that the phrase \u2018prior approval of Parliament\u2019 is not used as a term of art throughout the various provisions of the Constitution, 1992 but it is a convenient portmanteau term for what is usually the situation one way or the other; that it may mean assessment, scrutiny, or vetting to determine whether what is being approved meets the requisite standard, as contends by Nana Akufo-Addo, counsel for the plaintiff, or as in the three examples given by the Attorney-General counsel for the defendant with the three situations given above, namely articles 89(6), 124(5) and 174(2) of the Constitution, 1992\u201d.<\/p>\n

The Court\u2019s reasoning recognized that the expression \u201cprior approval\u201d must be interpreted in its constitutional context. It does not necessarily prescribe one uniform procedure for every situation in which the Constitution requires approval. However, the requirement cannot simply be disregarded.<\/p>\n

The Court went further to explain the meaning of prior approval in relation to ministerial appointments. It held:<\/p>\n

\u201cThe words \u2018prior approval\u2019 therefore means simply that before the President appoints a minister or deputy minister he or she must be put before Parliament for it to feel, show or say that such a person is good, acceptable or satisfactory. While the word \u2018prior\u2019 connotes accep\u00actance before an appointment becomes valid, \u2018approval\u2019 simpliciter connotes an acceptance after the appointment.\u201d<\/p>\n

The Court then made its position clear, speaking through Justice Aikins thus:<\/p>\n

\u201cI have no doubt in my mind that before a minister or deputy minister takes up an office, he or she needs to have the prior approval of Parliament. Any appointment by the President without the prior approval of Parliament would be unconstitutional and this court would have the power to so declare that appointment\u201d.<\/p>\n

It is important, however, to understand what the Supreme Court did not decide. The Court did not impose the Appointments Committee on Parliament or declare that Parliament must necessarily use that particular committee to conduct its vetting process. The Constitution does not prescribe the detailed procedure Parliament must follow to grant approval. Parliament retains the authority to determine the procedure through which it exercises that constitutional function.<\/p>\n

Therefore, Parliament may adopt a different committee structure or another procedure for considering nominees. What it cannot do is declare that no approval is required where the Constitution expressly makes approval a condition of appointment. The distinction is between Parliament\u2019s freedom to regulate its procedures and its obligation to comply with the Constitution.<\/p>\n

The Court captured this distinction in its conclusion as follows:<\/p>\n

\u201cThe Constitution, 1992 itself has not regulated the procedure for approval. It is a different matter if no approval at all is given for such appointments\u201d.<\/p>\n

By: Faith Klenam (Assistant Administrator, Legal Academy).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The Constitutional Role of Parliament\u2019s Appointments Committee: A Historical Overview and a Revisit of the Classic Case of Mensah v Attorney-General (1997\u20131998). Ghana adopted the 1992 Constitution, and the First Parliament of the Fourth Republic commenced on 7 January 1993. From the beginning of the Fourth Republic, parliamentary scrutiny of presidential appointments became an important<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-8399","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-tutorials"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/mylegalacademy.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8399","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/mylegalacademy.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/mylegalacademy.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mylegalacademy.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mylegalacademy.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=8399"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/mylegalacademy.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8399\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":8402,"href":"https:\/\/mylegalacademy.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8399\/revisions\/8402"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/mylegalacademy.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=8399"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mylegalacademy.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=8399"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mylegalacademy.net\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=8399"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}